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What José Luis Bermúdez calls the paradox of self-consciousness is essentially the 
conflict between two claims: 
 (1) The capacity to use first-personal referential devices like “I” must be 
explained in terms of the capacity to think first-person thoughts. 
 (2) The only way to explain the capacity for having a certain kind of thought 
is by explaining the capacity for the canonical linguistic expression of thoughts of 
that kind. (Bermúdez calls this the “Thought-Language Principle”.) 
 The conflict between (1) and (2) is obvious enough. However, if a paradox is 
an unacceptable conclusion drawn from apparently valid reasoning from apparently 
true premises, then Bermúdez’s conflict is no paradox. It is rather a conflict between 
the view that thought must be explained in terms of language, and the view that first-
person linguistic reference must be explained in terms of first-person thought. Neither 
view is immediately obvious, and nor is it obvious that the arguments for either are 
equally compelling. What we have here is a difference of philosophical opinion, not a 
paradox.  
 In itself, this may not be particularly important; perhaps Bermúdez could have 
called his book The Puzzle of Self-Consciousness and this would have described his 
main interest better. But in fact, it turns out that even the non-paradoxical conflict 
between (1) and (2)  is not Bermúdez’s theme. He is interested in the nature of self-
conscious thoughts about oneself: the kind of “I”-thoughts which Shoemaker 
famously called “immune to error through misidentification”. But the problems these 
thoughts raise are arguably independent of the relationship between (1) and (2). One 
could raise the problem of the relationship between thought and language without 
considering self-conscious “I”-thoughts: one could ask whether the use of (say) color 
terms should be explained in terms of the capacity to have certain kinds of 
experience, or vice versa. And one could raise questions about immunity to error 
without taking any view on the relationship between thought and language, or on the 
special nature of “I” and other first-person pronouns. Consider a speaker, rather like 
an Indian in an old Wild West movie, who refers to himself only as “Dances With 
Wolves”. Would all his utterances of  the form “Dances With Wolves is F” be subject 
to error through misidentification, simply because his idiolect has no first-person 
pronoun? Surely not. There will be many contexts in which it makes little sense for 
him to raise a question of the form “Someone is F; but is Dances With Wolves F?” 
for exactly the same sorts of reasons that we cannot sensibly raise parallel questions 
framed using “I”. 
 One might say here that the existence of a pronoun with variable reference is 
not the relevant point; the point is rather that some form of words is being used to 
express thoughts having this immunity property. This seems right; but it illustrates 
again that Bermúdez has somewhat mis-stated his theme: insofar as there are 
philosophical problems arising from this kind of immunity to error, their source is not 
the existence of personal pronouns. I would conjecture that this is Bermúdez’s 
underlying view too, since he declares his hand early on by rejecting (surely 
correctly) the Thought-Language Principle (25). And the rest of the book pays little 
attention to the way thought is expressed in language. 
 The book’s real aim is to give a general explanation of how thinkers can come 
to have self-conscious thoughts, given the rejection of the Thought-Language 
principle. Bermúdez requires that such an explanation is non-circular, since he wants 
to explain how it is possible that actual human infants acquire the concept of the first 
person (the Acquisition Constraint). Bermúdez’s account is based on the idea that 
pre-linguistic thinkers can satisfy the Acquisition Constraint because they can be in 
states with nonconceptual content. An intentional state S has nonconceptual content P 
when a thinker does not have to possess the concepts which are definitive of P in 
order to be in S. An example: I do not have to possess concepts of all the colors in my 
present experience in order to have an experience whose content presents all these 
distinct and varied colors.  
 The notion of nonconceptual content, originating with Gareth Evans, has 
come to play a role in a number of theories of mind in the last fifteen years. 
Bermúdez’s distinctive contribution to this debate is to hold, against Christopher 
Peacocke, that non-conceptual states are “autonomous”: that a creature could be in 
states with non-conceptual content without possessing any concepts at all (the 
Autonomy Principle). Bermúdez argues for this by marshalling a wide range of data 
from developmental psychology and phenomenology in defense of the attribution of 
states with nonconceptual content to pre-linguistic infants. He makes a good case for 
the thesis that this content is perspectival in a way that is closely related to the 
perspectival character of genuinely conceptual “I”-thoughts. 
 Bermúdez does not need to defend the Autonomy Principle as he actually 
states it, but only a weaker claim: that thinkers can be in states with nonconceptual 
contents without possessing any concepts at the time when they are in those states. 
For he is only concerned to show how self-conscious thought could develop in the 
psychological life of a human thinker—the evidence he cites from developmental 
psychology supports only the weaker thesis, since infants become conceptual thinkers 
eventually. The stronger Autonomy Principle would have to be defended by an 
examination of the evidence from animal psychology; an interesting project, but not 
one which Bermúdez (understandably enough) undertakes in this book. 
 Bermúdez may respond that if it is correct to attribute intentional states to 
animals at all, then such states will automatically be nonconceptual, since on his 
view, having concepts entails being a language-user. Given the existence of 
nonconceptual content, this is a weaker claim than the Thought-Language Principle. 
In keeping with his enthusiasm for named Principles, Bermúdez calls it “the Priority 
Principle” (42). The Principle is somewhat under-defended; this is a shame because it 
brings to the surface a problem with the notion of nonconceptual content. The notion 
is sometimes criticized because it involves a very demanding understanding of 
concept-possession. Theories of nonconceptual content make a sharp distinction 
between conceptual representation and other forms of mental representation—
Bermúdez is no exception—but they do not always explain the significance of this 
distinction, and without this the distinction can appear merely terminological. This is 
a particular danger for Bermúdez’s project, where having a concept is linked to 
having linguistic abilities. So for him, the question about whether conceptual thinking 
can be explained in terms of nonconceptual thinking amounts to this: whether the 
kind of thought which only language makes possible can be explained in terms of the 
kind of thought which can be had without language. An interesting project, certainly; 
but one that can be undertaken without mentioning nonconceptual content. In the 
absence of further motivation for the Priority Principle, critics of nonconceptual 
content could accept the main lines of Bermúdez’s argument while ignoring its appeal 
to nonconceptual content. They could just understand “nonconceptual content” as an 
abbreviation for the content of a kind of thought which can be had without language. 
But surely the term was meant to be more than just a simple abbreviation? 
 Nonetheless, Bermúdez’s book is ambitious, clearly written and contains a 
number of plausible and interesting new moves—chapter six on the awareness of the 
self in proprioception, for example, is the best in the book and merits further 
discussion. I do think that Bermúdez misrepresents what he is doing—solving a 
paradox, rather than proposing a novel reductive account of self-conscious thought—
but this does not detract in any important way from the other virtues of  the book. 
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